Management is buying/committing capital at a price it says the market itself just set against it — cheapness measured ag
The model's full reasoning — Q2 2018 call → NOWe need to determine if management describes deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is mispricing what it already has. The key is: does management assert that the value of its assets is materially below what they're worth, with a concrete anchor, and is the company acting on it by acquiring, retaining, or concentrating that exposure? Looking at the transcript: Management discusses investment markets, dispositions, acquisitions. They say they closed on one disposition in San Diego at a low 4% cap rate, and have one acquisition in a co-investment entity for ~$100M. They also revised investment guidance downward: they are modifying 2018 investment guidance to assume $100M-$300M of acquisitions and $200M-$300M of dispositions. They say they have chosen to stay disciplined and not acquire because assets are highly desirable and cap rates are tight. They are not buying because they think assets are cheap; they are actually selling some. They also have a stock buyback program, but they say "our dispositions guidance excludes funding for our $250 million stock buyback program. Therefore, the amount of dispositions could increase from our guidance range, subject to the stock buyback volume, which we would execute on a leverage-neutral basis." That suggests they might buy back stock, but they don't claim the stock is undervalued. They just mention it as a capital allocation tool. There is no statement that the market is mispricing their assets or shares. They talk about cap rates being stable, but they don't say they are too low or that their assets are worth more. They are not acquiring more of the same kind of asset at prices they call low; they are actually reducing acquisitions because prices are high. They are not retaining exposure because they think it's cheap; they are selling some assets. Thus, the answer is NO.
| Ticker | Company | Call | Date | Call grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESEA | Euroseas Ltd. | Q4 2022 | 2023-02-15 | C+ |
| CTHR | Charles & Colvard, Ltd. | Q1 2023 | 2022-11-06 | F |
| SBGI | Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. | Q3 2022 | 2022-11-02 | C |
| WD | Walker & Dunlop, Inc. | Q2 2022 | 2022-08-09 | C+ |
| TWO | Two Harbors Investment Corp. | Q2 2022 | 2022-08-04 | C+ |
TWO · Q2 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the mispricing to concrete, verifiable levels: mortgage spreads at “historically wide” levels (125–150 bp ZV/OAS, far above the non-QE average and the March 31 levels), RMBS coupons now trading at a wide range (2 %–5.5 %) with 300 bp “out-of-the-money” low-coupon pools and 97 bp OAS–ZV spread differential on higher-coupon names.
ESEA · Q4 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the undervaluation claim to a concrete, verifiable figure: their own estimate of the fleet’s market value at $666 million (derived from charter-adjusted values and market changes, incorporating the Aegean Express incident), which produces a net asset value of $344 million or >$48 per share.
WD · Q2 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the undervaluation claim to a concrete benchmark: CoStar trades at ~30x EBITDA while W&D trades at under 10x despite identical revenue and EBITDA growth rates over 5–10 years. They explicitly state there is “plenty of multiple expansion available to W&D.