Priced like the old business, running like a new one: management is redirecting the call away from the metric investors
The model's full reasoning — Q3 2021 call → NOThe question asks whether management repeatedly redirects attention away from the conventional measure and toward a different part of the business that is already earning today, while indicating the record hasn't caught up. Let me analyze the transcript for these three elements: 1. **Management identifies the conventional yardstick and sets it aside** - What is the conventional yardstick for a bank? Typically net interest margin, loan growth, deposits, etc. Let me look for management setting aside a conventional measure. Looking at the call, management discusses: - Earnings of $0.83 per share - Tangible book value - Efficiency ratio - Net interest margin of 3.07% - Loan production of $802 million - Deposits The discussion is fairly conventional for a bank earnings call. Management talks about loan originations, deposits, NIM, securitizations, etc. Is there a moment where management says "the old way of looking at us is wrong"? Let me look... Scott Kavanaugh says: "I mentioned last quarter that the transformation of our business model has really taken shape and the diversification of our offering has only strengthened our position as a regional commercial bank." He talks about C&I originations being 43% of total, equipment finance, builder finance, multifamily, single-family. David DePillo says: "the transformation of our balance sheet continues to develop nicely... our commercial business lending accounted for 43% of our originations for the quarter" There's discussion of the business model transformation - moving from a more traditional S&L-type model (multifamily lending) to a more diversified commercial bank with C&I lending, wealth management, etc. But is management actually setting aside a conventional yardstick? Let me look more carefully... The call discusses: - NIM at 3.07% - this is discussed as being affected by excess liquidity - Loan production - Deposits - Wealth management at $5.4 billion AUM - Cryptocurrency offering (prospective) - Texas expansion The wealth management business is mentioned: "our in-house private wealth management offering reached peak levels of assets under management by adding $109 million of organic new net growth and ending the quarter at $5.4 billion.
| Ticker | Company | Call | Date | Call grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NOAH | Noah Holdings Limited | Q1 2024 | 2024-05-30 | D |
| DUOT | Duos Technologies Group, Inc. | Q4 2023 | 2024-04-01 | F |
| OPAD | Offerpad Solutions Inc. | Q3 2023 | 2023-11-01 | C |
| SPT | Sprout Social, Inc. | Q2 2023 | 2023-08-04 | B+ |
| PRPH | ProPhase Labs, Inc. | Q1 2023 | 2023-05-11 | F |
| CALX | Calix, Inc. | Q1 2023 | 2023-04-20 | C+ |
| WD | Walker & Dunlop, Inc. | Q2 2022 | 2022-08-09 | C+ |
| LC | LendingClub Corporation | Q4 2021 | 2022-01-26 | A |
| CYBR | CyberArk Software Ltd. | Q3 2021 | 2021-11-04 | B+ |
| LPTH | LightPath Technologies, Inc. | Q4 2021 | 2021-09-09 | D |
| LOB | Live Oak Bancshares, Inc. | Q3 2018 | 2018-10-25 | C+ |
SPT · Q2 2023 → YESThe question is whether management repeatedly redirects attention away from the conventional measure toward a different part of the business that's already earning today, and indicates that this diffe...YES The transcript shows management repeatedly reframing away from the conventional total ARR/revenue growth metric (which is being distorted by unpredictable low-end non-core ARR) toward the higher-quality up-market/enterprise segment that is already delivering record new business ACVs, 50%+ YoY growth, and 43% of 2023 ARR. They explicitly set the low-end aside by removing it from forecasts and modeling to give “greatest visibility,” note that Q2 ARR growth will be the lowest pace of the year because of this change, and indicate the reported figures still reflect the old mix while the new up-market story is already earning today (with Tagger adding further upside not yet reflected). This creates the coherent posture of redirecting attention from the headline growth number outsiders watch to the part of the business that is already producing real results.
WD · Q2 2022 → YESThe question is about whether management repeatedly redirects attention away from the conventional measure to a different part of the business that's already earning today, and indicates that this isn...YES The transcript shows management repeatedly reframing the discussion away from the conventional multifamily agency lender yardstick (origination volumes, GSE lending, MSR-driven EPS) toward the diversified services and asset-management businesses that are already generating substantial cash revenue and EBITDA today. They explicitly set the old metric aside by introducing adjusted EPS to “strip out non-cash mortgage servicing rights,” highlight the shift from “lending-centric” to “broader technology-enabled financial services,” and note that segment results now provide “more transparency into our operating structure.” They point to debt brokerage, property sales, SAM (Alliant, Zelman), small-balance lending, and appraisals as the new earning engines, describing their concrete contributions (e.g.
CALX · Q1 2023 → YESThe question is about whether management repeatedly redirects attention away from the conventional measure to a different part of the business that's already earning today, and indicates that this isn...YES The transcript shows management repeatedly framing the company as operating in a "new market" centered on platforms, clouds, and managed services—distinct from the legacy hardware/cyclical model—while highlighting real earnings from these areas (e.g., 988 BSPs deploying platforms, 865 cloud customers, 334 with 41 new managed services in Q1, record Intelligent Access EDGE revenue). They indicate this is already producing revenue and customer adoption but remains early-stage ("this is the beginning," "early stage of where we are in this new market"), with reported results still reflecting the prior hardware-focused picture.