Priced like the old business, running like a new one: management is redirecting the call away from the metric investors
The model's full reasoning — Q4 2021 call → NOWe need to determine if management repeatedly redirects attention away from the conventional measure and toward a different part of the business that is already earning, and indicates the record hasn't caught up. The conventional yardstick for Kyndryl is likely revenue growth, signings, or overall financial performance. Management discusses revenue declines, signings below historical run rate, and then introduces three initiatives: alliances, advanced delivery, and accounts. They emphasize that these initiatives will drive future pretax income. But are they saying that a different part of the business is already earning now? They talk about partnerships with hyperscalers, certifications, and signings tied to those partnerships. They mention "targeting roughly $1 billion in signings tied to these hyperscaler partnerships" and "by next March, we'll enter our new fiscal year with about $200 million in annualized margin accretive revenue from the signings tied to those ecosystem partners." That is future, not current. They also talk about advanced delivery eliminating costs, but that's a cost saving initiative, not a revenue-earning part. The accounts initiative is about addressing substandard margins, also not a new earning part. Management does set aside the conventional yardstick? They say "our fourth quarter revenues and pretax income were in line with our guidance" and then discuss the future. They talk about "return to revenue growth" as a goal for 2025. They don't explicitly say the conventional metric is no longer the right thing to watch. They do emphasize the initiatives as the path to future profits, but they are not saying that a different part of the business is already earning now and that the reported figures don't reflect it. The initiatives are plans, not current earnings. The partnerships are signed, but the revenue from them is future. They mention "we've also quickly executed on our partnership agreements" and "we delivered new alliances" but that's about signing agreements, not earning revenue. They talk about certifications, but that's not revenue.
| Ticker | Company | Call | Date | Call grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NOAH | Noah Holdings Limited | Q1 2024 | 2024-05-30 | D |
| DUOT | Duos Technologies Group, Inc. | Q4 2023 | 2024-04-01 | F |
| OPAD | Offerpad Solutions Inc. | Q3 2023 | 2023-11-01 | C |
| SPT | Sprout Social, Inc. | Q2 2023 | 2023-08-04 | B+ |
| PRPH | ProPhase Labs, Inc. | Q1 2023 | 2023-05-11 | F |
| CALX | Calix, Inc. | Q1 2023 | 2023-04-20 | C+ |
| WD | Walker & Dunlop, Inc. | Q2 2022 | 2022-08-09 | C+ |
| LC | LendingClub Corporation | Q4 2021 | 2022-01-26 | A |
| CYBR | CyberArk Software Ltd. | Q3 2021 | 2021-11-04 | B+ |
| LPTH | LightPath Technologies, Inc. | Q4 2021 | 2021-09-09 | D |
| LOB | Live Oak Bancshares, Inc. | Q3 2018 | 2018-10-25 | C+ |
SPT · Q2 2023 → YESThe question is whether management repeatedly redirects attention away from the conventional measure toward a different part of the business that's already earning today, and indicates that this diffe...YES The transcript shows management repeatedly reframing away from the conventional total ARR/revenue growth metric (which is being distorted by unpredictable low-end non-core ARR) toward the higher-quality up-market/enterprise segment that is already delivering record new business ACVs, 50%+ YoY growth, and 43% of 2023 ARR. They explicitly set the low-end aside by removing it from forecasts and modeling to give “greatest visibility,” note that Q2 ARR growth will be the lowest pace of the year because of this change, and indicate the reported figures still reflect the old mix while the new up-market story is already earning today (with Tagger adding further upside not yet reflected). This creates the coherent posture of redirecting attention from the headline growth number outsiders watch to the part of the business that is already producing real results.
WD · Q2 2022 → YESThe question is about whether management repeatedly redirects attention away from the conventional measure to a different part of the business that's already earning today, and indicates that this isn...YES The transcript shows management repeatedly reframing the discussion away from the conventional multifamily agency lender yardstick (origination volumes, GSE lending, MSR-driven EPS) toward the diversified services and asset-management businesses that are already generating substantial cash revenue and EBITDA today. They explicitly set the old metric aside by introducing adjusted EPS to “strip out non-cash mortgage servicing rights,” highlight the shift from “lending-centric” to “broader technology-enabled financial services,” and note that segment results now provide “more transparency into our operating structure.” They point to debt brokerage, property sales, SAM (Alliant, Zelman), small-balance lending, and appraisals as the new earning engines, describing their concrete contributions (e.g.
CALX · Q1 2023 → YESThe question is about whether management repeatedly redirects attention away from the conventional measure to a different part of the business that's already earning today, and indicates that this isn...YES The transcript shows management repeatedly framing the company as operating in a "new market" centered on platforms, clouds, and managed services—distinct from the legacy hardware/cyclical model—while highlighting real earnings from these areas (e.g., 988 BSPs deploying platforms, 865 cloud customers, 334 with 41 new managed services in Q1, record Intelligent Access EDGE revenue). They indicate this is already producing revenue and customer adoption but remains early-stage ("this is the beginning," "early stage of where we are in this new market"), with reported results still reflecting the prior hardware-focused picture.